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Non-technical summary 
 
The duration of employment relationships is of substantial importance for both 
individual work histories and employers’ personnel policies. Using German 
linked employer-employee-data, which have recently been made available, we 
analyse job durations from both sides of the employment relationship. We 
address two main questions. First, are short employment spells found in one type 
of firms and long employment durations in another, or do most firms have long-
term as well as short-term workers? Is there evidence for segmentation within 
companies, such that a core workforce is protected against job losses by the 
employment of a marginal workforce with short tenure on average, or do 
observed differences in tenure mainly stem from different tenure levels at 
different firms?  
Our second question pertains to the influence of individual and firm 
characteristics on job tenure. While transitions from jobs depend on individual 
characteristics such as age or education, firm characteristics like size or industry 
and institutions such as works councils may also be important. Analysing the 
determinants of job duration is likely to lead to biased results if either firm or 
individual characteristics are left out of the analysis. We also investigate whether 
the role of worker and firm characteristics differs between transitions to different 
destination states, such as unemployment or a change to another employer.  
From our results, we conclude that most of the heterogeneity in job 
durations is not due to individuals’ employment in particular establishments. This 
is consistent with the view that long and short employment spells coexist at the 
firm level. The multivariate results show that low-skilled employees in low job 
positions have significantly shorter job durations, while there is little evidence 
that highly qualified employees are more mobile than others. Among firm 
characteristics, institutional variables such as the firm’s legal structure, the 
presence of a works council and, to a lesser degree, the adherence to collective 
agreements, matter for job durations. Firm size is of minor importance in this 
respect. Distinguishing between different destination states, we find that mobility 
to another job and exit to unemployment follow strikingly different processes.  
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1 Introduction 
How long workers stay in their jobs is of central importance for individual work 
histories, employers’ personnel policies, and the functioning of the labour market 
in general. Only recently, however, have linked employer-employee-data been 
made available to analyse job durations from both sides of the employment 
relationship. These data allow us to address a number of questions which have so 
far not been sufficiently investigated.  
 First, both individual and firm-specific reasons for job exit can be 
analysed. While transitions from jobs depend on individual characteristics such 
as age or education, firms also differ with respect to employment duration of 
their workers, due to, for instance, different needs of workforce adjustment. 
Whether a firm uses redundancies or adjusts by means of an internal labour 
market depends, in turn, on firm characteristics like size or industry and 
institutions such as works councils. Firm characteristics may also influence 
churning, i.e. separations that are not due to net reductions in the number of 
workers. Furthermore, the role of worker and firm characteristics is also likely to 
differ between transitions to different destination states. For instance, the 
presence of a works council may influence dismissals and individual quits 
independently and to different degrees. Analysing the determinants of job 
duration is likely to lead to biased results if either firm or individual 
characteristics are left out of the analysis.  
 Second, observed heterogeneity in tenure can be separated into 
heterogeneity within or across firms. Are short employment spells found in one 
type of firms and long employment durations in another, or do most firms have 
long-term as well as short-term workers? In other words, how much less 
heterogeneity is there in employment durations at the firm level than at the level 
of the whole economy? The distinction between tenure distributions within and 
across firms is related to the question whether there is labour market 
segmentation between long-lasting employment relationships and short-term 
jobs. Is this kind of segmentation occurring within companies, where a core 
workforce is protected against job losses by the employment of a marginal 
workforce (Abraham, 1988; Saint-Paul, 1996), or is it a phenomenon that is 
mainly visible in different job tenure averages in different firms? Institutions 
protecting insiders such as legal dismissal protection or works councils could 
give rise to dual labour markets within companies. 
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 Starting with the contributions of Burdett (1978) and Jovanovic (1979a,b), 
there has been much theoretical research on job durations in the context of the 
search and matching theory (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999 and Pissarides, 
2000 for reviews). These models give an equilibrium interpretation to the 
observed patterns of job changes underscoring in particular, the simultaneous 
determination of wages and job durations. While it would, in principle, be highly 
desirable to estimate a structural model of job change, this comes at the cost of 
losing flexibility in accounting for left- and right-censoring, duration dependence 
and different exit states. In this paper, therefore, we model job exit by a reduced-
form hazard rate model which does not include individual wages. 
Our data, taken from the German Linked Employer-Employee Dataset of 
the IAB (LIAB) longitudinal model, comprise all jobs starting in a panel of 4,200 
establishments in East and West Germany during the period from 1996 to 2001. 
A special feature of the data is that we have not only linked company and person 
information, but can estimate the whole tenure distribution (for up to 6 years) 
within each of the establishments in the dataset. A problematic feature is that in 
almost all cases, only one employment spell per person is represented in the data, 
which prohibits the use of flexible models for individual-level heterogeneity. 
 Using German data, job durations have been studied by Bender et al. 
(2000), Bellmann et al. (2000), Bergemann and Mertens (2002), Gerlach und 
Stephan (2005), Grotheer et al. (2004), Schasse (1991) and Wolff (2004). Of 
these studies, only Bender et al. (2000), Gerlach und Stephan (2005) and 
Grotheer et al. (2004) use linked employer-employee data.  
 Bender et al. (2000) as well as Grotheer et al. (2004) use combined 
register and survey data similar to the LIAB, although the observation period is 
shorter in both cases. Both conclude that characteristics of the employer (for 
instance employer size or training opportunities) have a significant influence on 
job exit. The main result of Gerlach und Stephan (2005), using data from the 
Salary and Wage Structure Survey, is that elapsed job duration is longer in firms 
with collective contracts.  
 Internationally, there are a few studies which take the effects of both 
individual and establishment characteristics on tenure into account. According to 
Bronars and Famulari (1997), individual characteristics and company fixed 
effects explain roughly the same proportion of the total variance in employment 
durations in the United States. A similar result is obtained by Mumford and 
Smith (2004). Additionally, they find some evidence for a sorting effect of 
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workers with particular characteristics into different companies. Shorter 
individual tenure of females disappears once workplace effects are allowed. This 
agrees with findings obtained by Gerlach and Stephan (2005). Dohmen and 
Pfann (2003) base their investigation on data from one large company so that 
time variation in firm-level characteristics can be used to identify their effects on 
job durations. 
 However, neither of these papers directly measures heterogeneity in job 
durations across and within firms. Bronars and Famulari (1997) analyse whether 
there is within or across establishment variation in wage growth and find across 
firm heterogeneity. Because of a positive correlation between wages and job 
durations they conclude that tenure is longer in firms with higher wage growth. 
However, all these studies use cross-sections of data and use elapsed tenure as 
the dependent variable while not accounting for right-censoring and length-bias. 
By contrast, we use a flow sampling scheme and observe workers over a 
maximum period of 6 years (1996 to 2001). We only deal with employment 
relationships started during this period to avoid problems of left-censoring. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
data base in detail and explain how job durations are obtained. In section three, 
the sample is defined and descriptive statistics are given. We also provide 
descriptive evidence on within- and across-firm heterogeneity in job durations in 
this part of the paper. Estimation methods and independent variables are 
introduced in section 4. The following section contains the estimation results, 
while some conclusions are drawn in the final section of the paper. 
 
 
2 Data description 
 
2.1 Basic features of the LIAB data 
The database of our study is the German LIAB, a linked employer-employee 
dataset which has recently become available to researchers at the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) (see Alda et al., 2005). The LIAB combines 
administrative data on employees with employer data from a large-scale 
representative survey of plants, the IAB Establishment Panel. This annual survey 
contains data on 16,000 establishments. The LIAB is exhaustive on the number 
of workers covered within the establishment sample. Referring to the 
classification of linked employer-employee data introduced by Abowd and 
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Kramarz (1999), the LIAB is a dataset representative for firms and their 
respective workers, and based on both administrative and statistical survey data.  
 The employee part of the LIAB is the Employment Statistics Register 
(Beschäftigtenstatistik) of the Federal Employment Agency (see Bender and 
Haas, 2002). This administrative data record is based on all declarations of 
employers to the German social insurance institutions and has been collected 
since 1973. Misreporting is a summary offence and can in grave cases even be 
prosecuted as a criminal offence. Therefore, the reliability of the data is high, 
although, this assessment may be qualified for individual variables such as 
education (see Fitzenberger et al., 2005). The data contains daily information on 
the beginning and end of all employment relationships covered by the social 
security system. Other forms of employment are not recorded in the data; this 
concerns, in particular, civil servants (Beamte), marginal work remunerated 
below a monthly income threshold, and employment in a foreign country. Self-
employed individuals (together with unpaid family workers) are also not 
included in the statistics. As a whole, the Employment Statistics Register covers 
about 80 per cent of total employment. 
 The Employment Statistics Register also contains information on a 
number of characteristics relating to the person or the job. There is information 
concerning age, sex, nationality, broad educational groups and profession (three-
digit level). Most importantly for the purpose of matching, the data contain an 
establishment identifier which is also used in the employee survey that contains 
the establishment information of the LIAB. 
 The Employment Statistics are combined with data on periods of transfer 
receipt. This information is obtained from the benefit recipient data 
(Leistungsempfängerdatei) of the Federal Employment Agency. Hence, spells of 
unemployment are only recorded if the unemployed person receives 
unemployment benefits and/or participates in active labour market policies. In 
other cases, there is no information about the employment status. With this in 
mind, complete employment biographies of all employees from the mid 1970s 
through (presently) 2002 can be constructed. 
 The IAB-Establishment Panel is an annual representative survey of 
establishments conducted by the Institute of Employment Research (more 
information can be found in Bellmann, 2002, and Kölling, 2000). Thus, the unit 
of observation is not the company as a legal entity but the plant or site where the 
economic activities are carried out. The survey started in 1993 with more than 
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4,000 establishments (West Germany only), was extended to the East in 1996 
and currently comprises almost 16,000 establishments in the whole of Germany. 
The sample is stratified according to the number of employees (obtained from the 
Employment Statistics Register) and industry. While the Establishment Panel is 
an almost complete survey of large establishments, the probability of inclusion in 
the sample drops to roughly one per cent for small establishments with 1 to 5 
employees.  
 The Establishment Panel contains numerous questions about employment, 
personnel policy, performance, investments and legal structure. Information on 
the number and composition of staff, the number of hirings and separations, 
working time and basic facts on industrial relations and other characteristics is 
provided annually. Other questions are asked only in certain years or in longer 
intervals. Most information relates to the situation on June 30th of each year. 
Employment flows can be obtained for the first six months of each year. For 
other information, the reference period can be one year or longer. 
 The employer data is matched with the (augmented) employment data 
through the establishment identifier and a variable indicating the year of the 
interview or the year in which a person was employed in the particular 
establishment. Two versions of the LIAB have been developed and made 
available to researchers at the IAB.1 There is a cross-section version with 
employer-employee-data containing all persons employed on June 30th of each 
year in an establishment participating in the survey. This version contains no 
historical data but only the information of this particular day. The second 
version, the LIAB longitudinal version, contains the employment history from 
January 1st, 1991, of persons who have been employed for at least one day in an 
establishment of the IAB-Establishment Panel during the period from January 
1st, 1996 to December 31st, 2001. Due to the longitudinal character of our 
research question, we use the second version in the present study.  
 The number of establishments used is limited to establishments having 
valid interviews from 1999 to 2001. If a firm was interviewed in the years 1993 
to 1998 too, the data is also available. This means that worker separations due to 
plant closures cannot be observed in the data. Hence, the LIAB longitudinal 
version contains a dataset with around 2,100 plants in West and around 2,100 
                                              
1  Rules for accessing the data can be found at http://fdz.iab.de/. For a description of the two versions 
see Alda et al. (2005). 
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plants in East Germany.2 Overall, the data is a sub-sample of the IAB 
Establishment Panel which is a representative 1 per cent sample of German 
establishments. Therefore, our data is representative and covers, if it is weighted, 
55.3 per cent of West German and 35.0 per cent of Eastern German 
establishments and 56.9 per cent of West German and 50.0 per cent of Eastern 
German employees (Alda et al., 2005: 15f). 
 
2.2 Constructing job durations from the LIAB data 
In the following, we define an employment spell as the period from the 
beginning until the end of an employment relationship within a particular 
establishment. In the original data, employment spells are recorded as a number 
of sub-spells. This is due to the fact that employers not only report the beginning 
and end of employment relationships to the insurance institution, but also 
changes in income and changes in insurance status. In addition, an annual report 
has to be given at the end of each year. Therefore, sub-spells reach over 365 days 
at most. If a person interrupts the employment relationship without formally 
terminating it, such as in cases of parental leave, the firm has to continue 
reporting on this person and only the wage is set to zero. Due to the variety of 
reasons for reports to the social security system, employment spells often consist 
of many more than one sub-spell, so that these sub-spells must be joined. 
 Because the beginning and the end of employment spells cannot be 
obtained directly from the data, we have to generate this information. Additional 
information is needed on the employment state before the current spell and the 
destination state after the spell. In the following, we describe the method to 
define these variables in detail, because these are the main variables of our study. 
For the sake of simplicity we start with the end of a spell and the definition of the 
destination states. 
 In our study there are four destination states: unemployment, non-
employment, change to a new employer or no further information. The current 
spell ends in a failure event if the individual moves to unemployment, non-
employment or to a new employer and the current employer stated “end of 
employment” in the report to the insurance institution. The current spell is right 
censored if we cannot observe the individual any more or if we cannot define a 
failure (due to the fact that the employer did not state “end of employment”). An 
                                              
2  For further information on the selection of the 4,200 establishments see Alda (2004b) and Alda 
(2004c). 
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end of the employment relationship could also be assumed whenever the 
establishment identifier changes. Unfortunately, however, the plant identifier 
sometimes changes although the individual continues working in the same 
workplace. This happens, for instance, when the legal identity of the employer 
changes. In our data this is only possible if a part of the establishment is legally 
separated from another part, the latter keeping the original identifier and 
remaining in the Establishment Panel. Because we observe a large number of 
cases in which the establishment identifier changes without the end of the 
employment relationship being recorded in the data, we assume errors in the 
allocation of the identifiers by the local Federal Employment Agencies. 
Therefore, we rely, in addition, on employers’ declarations.3 
 Concerning destination states, unemployment periods are difficult to 
define because, as mentioned above, the data only contains information for the 
time a person receives income transfers by the German Federal Labour Office. 
Because not all unemployed workers qualify for unemployment insurance (UI) 
and because of sanctions temporarily suspending benefit payments (e.g., in cases 
of quits), individuals can be unemployed without receiving UI benefits (see 
Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004; Lee and Wilke, 2005). We define unemployment 
as UI benefit receipt at least for one day within 60 days after the end of the 
previous employment spell. In this way, most individuals experiencing a benefit 
suspension should still be counted as unemployed. 
 A job-to-job change is defined as a separation followed by an employment 
spell within 60 days after the end of the previous employment spell. We 
hypothesize that in these cases the new employment relationship was already 
known when the previous job ended. A special case occurs if the employee 
returns to the same employer after some time (recall). This can be due to various 
reasons, such as employment breaks during the winter season or recessions, 
individual reasons such as ill health and others. We define a separation and 
subsequent return to the same employer within at most 90 days as a continuation 
of the current employment spell. This may be combined with periods of UI 
benefit receipt. With 90 days, the maximum duration for the transition to be 
considered as a continuation of the current spell may be too short to capture 
seasonal work. In future research, the sensitivity of the result with respect to this 
definition will be explored.   
                                              
3  This results in the fact that the number of right-censored spells is much higher in our study than in the 
study by Grotheer et al. (2004), who only rely on changes of the plant identifier. How the employer 
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 If a person did not receive benefits, did not change job-to-job within 60 
days after the current employment and did not return to the current employer 
within 90 days, the destination state is defined as non-employment. Under this 
category we subsume individuals who are out of labour force, search for a new 
job (i.e., are unemployed), become self-employed or move to a foreign country. 
In the following the definition of the destination states are summarized: 
 
Unemployment → receives unemployment benefits for at least one day 
within 60 days after separation, is not employed with 
current employer for at least 90 days after separation 
Non-
employment 
 
→ is not employed with current employer for the next 
90 days after separation, receives no unemployment 
benefits and does not change from job-to-job for at 
least 60 days after separation 
Job-to-job 
change 
→ takes up employment with another employer within 
60 days after separation 
 
To determine the beginning of a spell we proceed similarly, although we do not 
use the information on the reported end of employment. The state “no 
observation” is generated in cases of individuals who were not observed for at 
least one year before the start of the observation period on January 1st, 1996.  
 
Unemployment → received unemployment benefits for at least one day 
during 60 days before hiring, was not employed with 
current employer for at least 90 days before hiring 
Non-
employment  
 
→ was not employed with current employer for at least 
90 days before hiring, received no unemployment 
benefits for at least 60 days before hiring, did not 
change from job-to-job for at least 60 days before 
hiring 
Recall 
 
→ was employed with current employer for more than 
90 days before hiring, received no unemployment 
benefits during 60 days before hiring, did not change 
from job-to-job during 60 days before employment 
Job-to-job 
change  
→ did change from job-to-job at most 60 days before 
employment 
No observation → was not observed since January 1st, 1995 
 
                                                                                                                                    
identifier changes mistakenly in individual’s records will be investigated in further research.  
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3 Sample definition and descriptive statistics  
 
3.1 Sample definition 
We observe all employees of the sample establishments during 1996 to 2001. 
However, spells that started earlier in these establishments are only incompletely 
contained in the data, since many will have dissolved by January 1st, 1996. 
Hence, we face a problem of left-censoring: the sample of employment spells 
starting before 1996 and observed after 1996 is not representative of all spells 
starting in the establishment. In the following, therefore, we use only information 
on jobs started within the six-year interval defined above.  
 Although we have data on all episodes of employment and unemployment 
during 1991 and 2001 (the latter only in cases of UI benefit receipt), we only use 
those episodes for which we have corresponding establishment data. Therefore, 
our analysis is based on the years 1996 to 2001. If a firm was not interviewed in 
one of the years from 1996 to 1998, information from the next year available was 
used instead. Alternatively, we could have dropped firms for which we do not 
have data in every year but this would have induced too much loss of data.  
 If an individual is employed with more than one employer at the same 
time, we only use the employment spell generating the highest income. Spells 
lasting only one day are dropped, too. We restrict data to persons aged 25 to 52 
in order to drop short-term employment spells during school and university 
holidays, and to avoid confusion between job exit and early retirement. In 
addition, we exclude employees working less than 15 hours a week, apprentices 
and home workers. This means that spells with at least one sub-spell of part-time 
work below 15 hours, vocational training or home work are dropped. Despite the 
fact that we defined recalls within 90 days as continuation of employment we 
exclude the agricultural sector to avoid interruptions of spells due to seasonal 
work. Miners and female master craftsmen are dropped due to their extremely 
small numbers. All spells with missing covariate information are also eliminated 
from the data. These requirements leave us with a sample of 563,934 individuals 
and 1,384,065 employment spells. Of these episodes, 616,722 are from female 
workers and 528,420 concern establishments in the new Länder of the East. 
Table 1 shows the sample employment spells according to previous 
employment and destination states. Due to the relatively short observation 
period, most of the spells are right-censored. In East Germany, more than 30 per 
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cent of all new relationships end in unemployment. In West Germany, the share 
of job-to-job changes is higher than the share of transitions into unemployment. 
Changes into non-employment do not occur very often. The same applies to the 
previous employment state, where a high share of recalls is striking. This can be 
due to the structure of our data set. The probability that a person is observed 
twice in two different establishments is relatively small. Moreover, individuals 
with recall are over-represented because we observe all new employment spells 
which started in the observation period in a particular establishment. However, 
other studies find a high share of recalls in the German labour market (see 
Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1995). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
3.2 Kaplan-Meier estimations 
With a non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimation it is possible to estimate survival 
rates for the whole sample as well as for different groups of individuals and to 
obtain a first impression of possible differences between individual- or firm-
specific characteristics. The survivor function ( )S t  gives the probability of 
surviving up to time t. The formula for the estimated survivor function is the 
following: 
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where jn is the number of persons employed at time jt  and jd  is the number of 
failures at time jt . The product is over all observed failure times less than or 
equal to t (see, for instance, Cleves et al. 2002). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 In figure 1 Kaplan-Meier survival curves are presented separately for men 
and women and West and East Germany.4 In West Germany, 50 per cent of male 
employees have left their employer after about 900 days. In East Germany, exit 
                                              
4  We use the cross-sectional weights included in the IAB Establishment Panel for the Kaplan-Meier-
estimations.  
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occurs faster: the median duration is about 650 days. The median duration for 
West German women is 1,100 days and for East German women 1,900 days. The 
longer median job durations of women are in contrast to results of recent studies 
for Germany (Bergemann und Mertens, 2002; Gerlach und Stephan, 2005). A 
reason may be that, according to our definitions, employment spells continue 
even in cases of taking a sabbatical or during parental leave. However, at the long 
end of the distribution, which we cannot observe, the reverse could be true (i.e. 
longer job durations for men).  
 Whereas the curves of West Germans are relatively smooth, the East 
German curves show a fall after exactly one year. In the Eastern Länder more 
than 10 per cent of female and more than 5 per cent of male spells end precisely 
after one year. This is due to the higher incidence of temporary employment 
especially in job creation schemes in East as compared to West Germany.5 This 
result is also found in Grotheer et al. (2004) and draws attention to the very 
different labour market conditions in East and West Germany.  
 Survival rates for employees with different education levels are presented 
in figure 2.6 It is obvious that the higher the skill group the longer is tenure. 
Furthermore, one can observe a higher fall after one year for less skilled 
employees in East Germany. This can also be observed for low skilled employees 
in West Germany, which again supports the interpretation that these falls are due 
to subsidised employment in active labour market measures.  
 
Figure 2 here 
 
In figure 3, we look at the survival curves for different age groups. As one would 
expect, the survivor curves are monotonically ordered, with young employees 
having the lowest and the oldest age group the longest employment durations. 
Grotheer et al. (2004) find the lowest job durations within the youngest age 
group in West Germany and within the oldest age group in East Germany. This 
                                              
5  Unfortunately we cannot identify those jobs in the data. But in the year 2003 75 per cent of all 
persons in job creating programmes participating employees were employed in East Germany 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2004: 116f.). However, on the basis of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
Boockmann and Hagen (2006, Appendix 1) report that more than twelve per cent of East German 
females work in fixed-term contract employment (as opposed to close to seven per cent in the West), 
and the share of publicly subsidised work in fixed-term employment is 33 per cent in the East and 
less than three per cent in the West. 
6  In the following Kaplan-Meier graphs, we distinguish between West and East Germany but not 
between the sexes. 
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discrepancy could be due to the fact that we excluded employees in vocational 
training and individuals above 52 years from the sample. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
One of the main issues of this paper is whether heterogeneity of employment 
durations is due to heterogeneity within or across firms. With Kaplan-Meier 
estimates for different firm-sizes we can point out differences in the 
unconditional survival rates between firms. In figure 4, Kaplan-Meier survival 
curves for West and East German employees are drawn separately for firm-size 
categories. Whereas in West Germany survival rates are higher for larger 
establishments, in East Germany firms with 20 to 99 and more than 1,000 
employees have the highest survival rates. In addition, the curves for firms with 
more than 100 employees become flatter after two years in East Germany. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
There should be differences in the shape of survival rates concerning destination 
states if the decision to end an employment relationship depends on different 
circumstances. As can be seen from figure 5, survival curves for employees 
moving to unemployment are more convex, especially in the first two years of 
employment as compared to job-to-job transitions. A drop in the survival rate 
after one year in East Germany only occurs for individuals moving into 
unemployment. This could be due to one-year job creating programmes for 
employees who are unemployed before and after. The survival curve of movers 
into non-employment decreases in the first year and is almost horizontal later on. 
However, only a low proportion of observed employees move into non-
employment. The differences in the shape of the survival curves for different 
destination states indicate that a competing risks model separating between exit 
states may be appropriate in multivariate estimation.  
 
Figure 5 here 
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3.3 Heterogeneity of job durations within and across establishments 
Next, we analyse whether heterogeneity occurs across or within establishments 
by comparing the distribution of job durations of the whole sample with the mean 
of the distributions within the firms. Figure 6 shows a stylised example of why a 
difference may arise. In the first graph the density function of job durations 
estimated for all employees in the sample is shown.7 The difference between the 
10 per cent and the 90 per cent quantile is assumed to be 1,200 days. In the 
second graph, the density functions for two of the sample firms are drawn. It is 
assumed that all firms differ in average job durations but that the variance is the 
same. Therefore, the mean of the distance between the 10 per cent and the 90 per 
cent quantiles is 600 days. Hence, in this example the heterogeneity of job 
durations is explained to a large part by different average job durations across 
firms. 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
To distinguish heterogeneity in job durations within and across firms 
empirically, we first estimate quantiles of the distribution function f(t). The 
differences between quantiles are then interpreted as measures of heterogeneity 
in the distribution of employment durations. We compare the overall 
heterogeneity of durations in the sample to the within-firm heterogeneity. The 
latter is obtained by estimating the quantiles separately and then taking a 
weighted average (weighted by the number of spells in the firm available at the 
quantile date). Unlike the quantile differences for the whole sample, the 
differences of theses averages do not contain the between-firm heterogeneity. We 
restrict ourselves to estimating the differences between the 10 per cent quantile 
and the 50, 40 and 30 per cent quantiles, respectively.  
 To calculate the quantiles of the distribution function, we use the Kaplan-
Meier estimator ˆ( )S t  again in order to take into account right-censoring properly. 
The main problem is that, due to the relatively small observation period, the 
quantiles may not be available for some firms. To overcome this problem, 
averages are calculated as follows: 
 
                                              
7  The hypothetical curves are drawn for the sake of the example only, and do not represent the 
distribution of real job durations.  
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where 1,...,j m=  denotes establishments and  the quantile difference ,10rα  is 
measured in days. Establishments with an α-quantile ˆˆ { | ( ) 1 }j jq t S tα = = −α  
outside the range of observations are excluded from the calculation of both αq  
and ( )10q
α . Hence, every ,10rα  is based on a different set of observations, denoted 
by (α).  To ensure that spells enter with the same weights in the overall and firm-
averaged quantiles, the average in equation (2) is weighted by the number of 
spells in the establishment, where nα is the number of spells with duration ˆα≥t q  
and nj is the number of spells in establishment j with duration ˆ α≥ jt q .8  
 The average quantile differences ,10rα  are then compared to the quantile 
difference ,10rα  obtained over the whole sample for the same set of observations. 
If the unit averages are shorter than the quantile differences for the whole sample, 
this indicates that the sample duration distribution is more dispersed than the 
unit-specific duration distribution, indicating that some of the heterogeneity 
arises due to the between-firm variation in job durations. Clearly, taking the 
average only over the establishments for which the quantiles are available may 
have an impact on the results, since individuals in these units have shorter job 
durations than the sample average. Therefore, interpretation of the results should 
not be extended to firms with long durations. Another limitation is that due to the 
short observation period, the highest quantile is the 50 per cent quantile. 
Obviously, heterogeneity at the long end of the duration distribution may differ 
in its composition from heterogeneity at other durations.  
 Table 2 shows the establishment averages of the quantile differences as 
well as the quantile differences estimated by a single Kaplan Meier survivor 
function over the same samples. It also contains the percentage reduction of the 
interquantile range induced by averaging over firm-specific quantiles. The 
numbers of establishments that reach the lower quantile are displayed in 
parentheses. For instance, the numbers in the first three rows and the first column 
                                              
8   The first number is obtained by performing a Kaplan-Meier estimation over the observations in all 
units with an α-quantile inside the observation period.  
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imply that 406 days pass between the points of time when 10 and 50 per cent of 
all West German male workers employed in the 903 firms used for the analysis 
have left their job. By contrast, on average over these firms, only 315 days pass 
between the 10th and the 50th percentile. Thus, the within-sector dispersion is 22 
per cent lower than the overall dispersion in the sample and a considerable part of 
the heterogeneity seems to be due to firm effects.   
 
Table 2 here 
 
However, the other results in the table do not support the proposition that within-
firm dispersion is vastly lower than the dispersion of job durations in the whole 
economy. A sizeable reduction in the quantile differences is only achieved if the 
50 per cent or 40 per cent quantiles are considered while the reduction is lower 
for the 30 per cent quantile. In one instance, the dispersion even increases if the 
average over establishments is taken. However, the reductions in dispersion are 
relatively low, ranging between two and 29 per cent.  
  To summarise, it appears that most of the heterogeneity in job durations is 
not due to individuals’ employment in particular establishments. Rather, the 
overall dispersion of job durations is reproduced to a large extent in a similar 
dispersion at the firm level. Having said this, the reduction of dispersion 
achieved by accounting for establishment differences is not completely 
negligible. Therefore, observed or unobserved firm heterogeneity still needs to be 
accounted for in multivariate estimation.  
 
 
4 Estimation technique and independent variables 
 
4.1 Estimation technique 
We estimate job durations by the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard 
model (Cox, 1978). This model is flexible because the baseline hazard is not 
estimated and therefore no assumptions about the shape of the hazard are 
imposed. Furthermore, the model allows stratified estimation which is important 
in order to take unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity into account. To estimate 
the coefficients of different covariates according to destination state, the Cox 
model can be extended to the independent competing risks model.  
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 The hazard rate for individual i (i=1,…, nj) employed in firm j (j=1,…,m) 
at time t, written as ( )λij t , is 
 
0 1 1 2 2( ) ( )exp[ ( ) ' ] ,        with  ( ) ' ( ) ' ( ) ' 'λ = λ θ θ = β + γ + γij ij ij i j jt t z t z t x t w t w , (3)
 
where ( )ix t  are (time-varying as well as time-constant) individual-specific 
characteristics, 1 ( )jw t  are firm-specific time-varying and 
2
jw  are time-invariant 
firm-specific characteristics. The θ, β, γ1 and γ2 are parameters to be estimated. 
The model is called a proportional hazard model because the baseline hazard 
0 ( )λ t  is assumed to be shifted proportionately by the covariates. The 
independent variables are assumed to be exogenous with respect to the transition 
process. Abstracting from right-censored observations, the likelihood function of 
the unstratified model is 
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where k is a further index for firms and l an index for individual spells. In the 
likelihood contributions, the product of which is taken in (4), Rk(t) is the set of 
employment spells in establishment k being at risk at time t. In the following, it is 
referred to as the risk set in establishment k. Summing over establishments, we 
obtain all spells that are ongoing at time t. The expression (4) is only calculated 
for periods in which a transition is actually made. The regression constant and 
the baseline hazard λ0(t) cancel out from the formula. 
 If censoring is independent, as we assume in the following, right-censored 
spells can easily be accommodated by the partial likelihood technique by 
excluding them from the risk set at the time of censoring (see Lancaster, 1990: 
250ff.).9  
 Although we include some firm characteristics in our model, firm-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity could also lead to a bias in estimation results. Hence, 
we account for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity by stratifying the sample 
                                              
9  The case of dependent censoring arises if the likelihood of a later episode being censored depends on 
the length of the previous spell. See Wang and Wells (1998) for this case. 
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according to establishments in some of the estimations. The principle of the 
stratified partial likelihood estimator is to decompose the total likelihood into 
several sub-likelihoods specific for each stratum (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002: 
118f.; Lancaster, 1990: 268ff.; Ridder and Tunali, 1999). This means that a 
separate baseline hazard 0 ( )j tλ  is assumed for each establishment, whereas the 
estimated parameters are assumed to be the same over all establishments. The 
individual-specific hazard in the stratified model is 
 
     0 1 1( ) ( )exp[ ( ) ' ] ,        with  ( ) ' ( ) ' ( ) 'λ = λ θ θ = β + γij j ij ij i jt t z t z t x t w t . (5) 
 
In this case, the coefficients of time-varying firm-specific variables are identified 
while those of time-constant variables are not identified. For the stratified model, 
the partial likelihood is 
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In contrast to the unstratified model (4), there is an establishment-specific risk set 
which comprises all employment spells in the establishment that continue at 
duration t.  
  While we allow for unobserved firm-specific effects in (6), we do not 
include individual-specific effects in the current version of the paper. Handling 
individual fixed effects in a non-restrictive way is only feasible if there is more 
than one uncensored employment spell per person. This would require that 
information is available for both employment spells, so that both spells are from 
employers in the Establishment Panel. Given the relative size of the 
Establishment Panel to the whole economy and, in particular, the relatively small 
time span (see above), this would result in a highly selective sample. Assuming 
independence between firm and person effects and between covariates and 
person effects, one could include person-specific effects as random effects by 
estimating a frailty model as described by, for instance, Ridder (1989). However, 
the assumption of independence may be dubious. Moreover, computational limits 
render this solution infeasible. Hence, we present estimations without person 
effects in the following. This implies relatively stringent assumptions on the joint 
distribution of person-specific and firm-specific unobservables and covariates in 
 19
order to obtain consistent estimates (see Abowd et al., 1999). A consistent 
estimator would require that the unobserved person-specific effects are 
distributed independently from the covariates and the firm-specific effects. This 
implies, for instance, that companies with high tenure do not attract workers who 
desire long-term contracts.  
 The determinants of job durations are likely to differ according to 
destination state. For instance, as individuals reach higher ages, they may leave 
the labour force with higher probability but are less likely to make a transition to 
a new job. Therefore, we distinguish between exit states in some of the 
estimations. Again in order to keep things simple, we choose independent 
competing risks. This means that the destination-specific durations are 
distributed independently (see Lancaster, 1990: 99ff.; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 
2002: 247ff.). Under this assumption, we can write the destination-specific 
likelihood function as 
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Here, all spells are included in the risk set for destination d at duration t 
unless they are observed to end with a transition to d at a date earlier than t, are 
censored before t or end with a transition to another state. A problem is that the 
coefficients from the competing risks model cannot be interpreted as the effects 
of the independent variables on the probability of exiting to the destination state 
in question (Thomas, 1996). Instead, the coefficients must be interpreted as the 
magnitude of the influences relative to staying in the initial state.10  
 
4.2 Independent variables 
Concerning the inclusion of covariates, we consider the following variants of the 
model: 
• inclusion of individual-specific factors only, 
• addition of firm-specific to individual-specific variables, 
                                              
10  One could also calculate marginal effects as proposed by Arntz (2005). However, in our case this 
would be computationally too burdensome. 
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• addition of firm fixed-effects (time-constant firm-specific variables are not 
identified in this model and are, therefore, excluded), 
• an independent competing risks version of the model with firm-specific 
and individual-specific variables. 
In table A1 in the appendix, the number of observations and failures as well as 
means and standard deviations of all covariates used in the estimations are listed. 
There are some structural differences between West and East Germany 
concerning age and education at the individual level and firm-size at the firm-
level. The rich pool of person- and firm-specific variables opens great 
possibilities to estimate the determinants of employment duration. Whereas some 
covariates only serve as control variables, there are some that are of interest from 
an economic point of view. 
 Concerning individual characteristics first, we include sex, age, education, 
occupation, profession, nationality and previous employment status. With the 
impact of age we can test whether young people move more frequently than older 
individuals. This is suggested by the job-shopping theory (Johnson, 1978; 
Viscusi, 1980), according to which younger workers acquire information while 
searching for a better match. For the multivariate analyses we generated age 
intervals to take non-linear effects into account.  
 On the one hand, we expect employees with low education who are in low 
job positions to be employed in unstable jobs. On the other hand, high-skilled 
employees are expected to be more mobile. Both would lead to shorter job 
durations. We expect foreign nationals from non-EU-countries to have shorter 
job durations than others because they are often employed in unstable jobs. 
Employment history may also be an important determinant of job durations but 
the interpretation of the effects is difficult. On the one hand persons who often 
change their jobs and are unemployed or out of the labour force in between could 
be stigmatized and therefore only receive offers for unstable jobs. On the other 
hand employment history is expected to be highly correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, including this variable leads to an endogeneity problem 
which can be solved with fixed-effects estimations. Nevertheless, we use these 
variables to control for individual heterogeneity. We only condition on a small 
part of individual’s employment history, namely the employment state before the 
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current spell. Finally, six broadly defined occupational categories are included in 
the specification.11 
 Controlling for firm-specific heterogeneity helps to reduce a bias in the 
coefficients of the individual-level variables resulting from selection into firms 
with long employment durations and firms with short employment durations. 
Firm size is part of this context. We expect tenure to be higher in larger 
establishments where employment can be adjusted within an internal labour 
market. The same applies to firms with various establishments where employees 
could change between them. Unfortunately we cannot observe those changes. 
Codetermination should lead to longer employment durations due to the fact that 
one of a council’s legal competences concerns dismissal procedures. Moreover, 
the works council could decrease the number of quits if, due to a collective voice 
function, workers are more satisfied with their jobs in companies in which a 
works council is established. Works councils may also influence the number of 
workers in temporary employment (Boockmann and Hagen, 2003). We have 
very detailed information about collective bargaining and, therefore, are able to 
discuss different interesting influences. Sector-level collective bargaining 
traditionally is more wide-spread in West Germany where bargaining takes place 
at the firm-level more frequently in East Germany (see table A1 in the appendix). 
This is due to the fact that many firms have left the employers’ associations in 
the East during the 1990s. For establishments bargaining on the firm level one 
would expect longer tenure because unions are interested in stable jobs for their 
members as well as in wage increases. Bargaining at the firm level may make it 
easier to react to negative shocks by reducing wages instead of making workers 
redundant. 
 Due to the tight economic situation the share of firms paying more than 
the collectively agreed wages is lower in the new Länder. Gerlach and Stephan 
(2005) expect collective contracts to have a positive impact on job tenure because 
higher wages are an incentive for employees to stay with the firm. The firm 
anticipates this and invests more in firm-specific training which again leads to 
                                              
11  On the basis of a Classification of Occupations provided by the Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt), all 369 occupations contained in the Employment Register have been 
accumulated so that 6 occupational groups remained (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992).  
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more job stability.12 On the other hand, a firm with collective agreements cannot 
compensate negative shocks by adjusting wages and therefore has to adjust 
employment. Therefore, one would suspect that tenure is shorter in firms with 
sector-based collective bargaining at least if there is a negative shock. However, 
a firm, paying wages above the collectively set level, has some leeway of 
reducing them in bad times instead of reducing employment.  
 We expect older establishments to have longer job tenure because they 
have better established market positions and may have more experience in hiring 
adequate workers. The variable concerning further training is motivated by 
human capital theory. If a firm invests in further training for its employees, it has 
a crucial interest not to lose this human capital and to reduce quits. Therefore, we 
expect that further training has a positive impact on tenure. Something similar are 
investments in ICT because they often lead to the necessity of special training. 
On the other hand this can lead to higher turnover rates because older employees 
are not able (or do not want) to operate with new technologies and new 
employees, familiar with these technologies, are hired. 
 As mentioned above, some establishment information was extrapolated if 
in one year there was no interview. Most of the firm characteristics we use do not 
change over time, so this problem does not appear serious. We define 12 sector 
dummies and 9 dummies for intervals of the firm size distribution. As an 
indicator for the local labour market, we use a one year lag of the local 
unemployment rate because the unemployment rate at the time of the hazard 
could be endogenous.13  
 
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
The presentation of the results is organised according to groups of coefficients. 
Results are presented for men and women in East and West Germany in tables 3 
to 6. The first three columns of each table differ in the degree to which firm-
specific characteristics are taken into account. First of all, we discuss estimates of 
coefficients of individual-specific variables and their robustness according to the 
                                              
12  From other studies, there is robust evidence that wages rise with tenure. If these tenure increases are 
in the form of payments above collectively agreed levels, an endogeneity problem may arise here 
(Abowd and Kang, 2002). Therefore, coefficients of this variable should be interpreted with care. 
13  Strictly speaking, we use the residuals of the time trend over the observation period to eliminate time 
effects. 
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consideration of firm-specific effects (subsection 5.1). In subsection 5.2 we 
discuss the influence of firm characteristics. The competing risks model, fourth 
and fifth columns in tables 3 to 6, is dealt with separately in subsection 5.3. We 
used sampling weights in all estimations. All specifications contain industry and 
regional dummies which, however, are neither shown nor interpreted. All tables 
display hazard ratios in order to facilitate the quantitative interpretation of the 
covariate effects. 
 
5.1 Coefficient estimates for individual-specific characteristics 
An important determinant of job exit is age. As expected, hazard ratios decline 
monotonically and significantly with age (except for East German men). Effects 
are also quantitatively large. For instance, the job exit hazard for a West German 
male worker aged 45 to 52 is 40 per cent lower than the hazard rate of a man 
aged 25 to 29. However, age effects are markedly less pronounced for women, 
for East German women in particular, and they are virtually non-existent for East 
German men. These findings – that are similar to other studies (Gerlach and 
Stephan, 2005; Wolff, 2004) – could point to the importance of career 
interruptions and subsequent job shopping even at older ages after German 
reunification. They could, however, also reflect a higher risk of unemployment at 
older ages in East Germany. In general, coefficients are influenced only little by 
the inclusion of firm variables or firm fixed effects. 
 
Tables 3-6 here 
 
 The results show that both vocational training and a university degree tend 
to reduce the job exit hazard as compared to the reference group (persons without 
vocational or professional training). One explanation may be that both forms of 
education facilitate the acquisition of firm-specific human capital which, in turn, 
retards job changes. This is in contrast to Gerlach and Stephan (2005) and 
Mumford and Smith (2004) who find lower job durations for high skilled than for 
low skilled workers. This could be due to the fact that our observation period 
covers six years whereas in these studies effects result from the influence of very 
long job durations. However, only among West German men does a university 
degree consistently lead to the highest job stability. Among East German women, 
in particular, job durations are longest among workers with vocational training. 
Throughout all population groups, workers with A-levels (Abitur) and vocational 
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training but without a university degree do not have higher job stability than the 
baseline category of low-skilled workers. Overall, the effects of education are 
quite robust to the inclusion of firm variables. 
 Concerning job position, the reference group is unskilled blue-collar 
workers. Skilled blue-collar workers have significantly lower job exit rates in 
most population groups, the exception being West German women. This may be 
explained by the fact that the number of unskilled blue-collar female workers is 
relatively low. In all four groups, white-collar workers have significantly lower 
hazard rates. The order of magnitude is high and exceeds the influence of the 
educational groups. However, the effect tends to weaken as firm-specific 
covariates are accounted for, pointing to the fact that particular workers are 
employed by firms with particular characteristics. Master craftsmen (due to the 
small number of occurrences for women, the coefficient is estimated only for 
men) have similar exit rates as white-collar workers. Part-time work increases job 
durations, but only for women, and in West Germany more so than in the East of 
the country. Whereas our findings are consistent concerning job position with the 
results of Gerlach and Stephan (2005) and Mumford and Smith (2004) the latter 
find negative effects for part-time workers estimating a model jointly for men 
and women. 
 Production workers do not uniformly have higher or lower exit rates than 
service workers (the baseline group). Moreover, the inclusion of firm-specific 
variables often changes the results with respect to this variable. A similar 
conclusion holds for nationality. Although it appears that citizens from other EU 
countries have lower and non-EU foreigners higher job exit rates, hardly any 
significant effects remain in stratified estimation. This agrees with Mumford and 
Smith (2004) who conclude that individuals with certain characteristics, for 
instance the racial background, are sorted in establishments with low job 
durations. 
 Previous employment status seems to matter a lot for job stability. 
Individuals who started their job out of unemployment have a significantly 
higher job exit rate than persons who moved from one job to another. This is 
true, in particular, for women and East German workers. In these groups, the 
magnitude of the effect ranges from 50 to 85 per cent. Employees who return to 
their employers after a period of non-employment have, by far, the longest 
employment durations. For women, parental leave can be an explanation, but not 
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for men. Clearly, with respect to endogeneity this result deserves further 
investigation in future research.  
 The local labour market seems to have an ambiguous impact on tenure. 
For West Germany the effect is not significant. In East Germany, the impact of 
the local unemployment rate (lagged by one year) is positive. This agrees with 
the results of Mumford and Smith (2004) who find a positive effect of the local 
unemployment rate on average workplace tenure due to decreased quit rates. 
There is also indication of calendar time effects: with time, job stability seems to 
be somewhat decreasing. 
 Comparing the results with and without firm-level covariates or firm fixed 
effects, we find that accounting for these effects is important for the impact of a 
number of individual-level variables on tenure. In particular, coefficients for 
variables relating to the profession and nationality of the individual are highly 
sensitive to the inclusion or otherwise of firm-level information. Other variables, 
such as age and education, however, have a more robust influence on job 
durations.  
 
5.2 Coefficient estimates for firm-specific characteristics  
Apart from their effect on worker-level covariates, the influence of establishment 
characteristics is also interesting in its own right. Only some of them are included 
in stratified estimation, since only coefficients of time-varying variables are 
identified in this model. Among these variables, the influence of investment into 
ICT comes out consistently strong for male workers, but much less so for female 
employees. Lower job exit rates among men suggest a stronger complementarity 
between male than between female workers’ firm-specific skills and 
establishment technology.  
 There are mixed results on the effects of collective agreements on job 
stability. Only for East German women, firms’ adherence to collective 
agreements slows down job exit according to all coefficient estimates. The 
patchy evidence may be due to the fact that the inclusion of job security 
provision into collective agreements is far from uniform in German industries. 
Male workers are affected negatively in their job exit behaviour if the firm pays 
in excess of collectively agreed rates, as one would expect. However, the same is 
not true for women. These results are similar in stratified and unstratified 
estimation. The impact of collective contracts on tenure is the main issue in 
Gerlach and Stephan (2005). They find that workers in Lower Saxony have 
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significantly higher job durations in firms with collective contracts. Moreover, 
male workers in establishments with firm level contracts exhibit the highest job 
stability. However they cannot control for the presence of a works council, which 
can lead to omitted-variable biases. 
 Our results provide some indication that further training prolongs tenure: 
according to the unstratified estimations, the hazard rate is reduced by about ten 
per cent in establishments that offer training. However, this result is not obtained 
in stratified estimation, where inference is restricted to companies introducing or 
cancelling firm-sponsored training. Unfortunately, we have no information on 
individual training participation in the data. By contrast this is available for 
Mumford and Smith (2004) who find higher job exit rates in case of employer-
provided training.    
 Among time-constant firm-level variables, the presence of a works council 
leads to significantly longer employment durations, a finding that is consistent 
with the large literature on works councils in Germany (Addison et al., 2001). 
The implied decrease in the hazard ranges from 15 to 25 per cent. The legal form 
of the establishment is also of primary importance. In particular, public 
corporations and other legal forms like associations have far lower job exit rates 
than enterprises under private proprietorship. This indicates differences in 
personnel policy according to the necessity of competitiveness. The effect is 
more pronounced in West Germany than in the East.  
 Interestingly, our results show that we cannot support the hypothesis “the 
larger the firm, the more stable jobs are”. Only in West Germany, there appears 
to be a pattern such that firms below 100 employees have higher and large firms 
with more than 200 employees have lower job exit rates than the baseline 
category (firms with 100 to 200 employees). But even in this case, the clear 
ordering that appears in the Kaplan-Meier graphs for West Germany (see figure 
4) seems to be captured by other variables, such as legal ownership form or 
works council presence. This agrees with Grotheer et al. (2004) who find that 
including the works council variable in the estimation leads to less clear firm size 
effects than are expected according to univariate analyses. Moreover, Mumford 
and Smith (2004) cannot find significant effects of firm-size on the average 
tenure of a workplace in Great Britain. For East Germany even the Kaplan-Meier 
curves are not as clear as one would assume. Estimation results for the new 
Länder exhibit the tendency that smaller firms with more than 20 employees 
have longer job durations than middle-sized companies in the reference group, 
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especially for female workers. But results differ between sexes for firms with 
more than 200 employees.14 Overall, we cannot find robust evidence for internal 
labour markets providing more job stability within a firm in the first six years of 
employment. 
  The age of the establishment is insignificant among West German men 
whereas new establishments have the lowest hazard rates among all other 
groups.15 This finding appears surprising at first sight but it needs to be recalled 
that the data comprises only companies that existed throughout the whole 
observation period. Therefore, job exits from companies that went bust are not 
contained in the data. In East Germany, firms founded before 1980 have positive 
effects of more than 20 per cent. This may reflect the fact that many of these 
establishments are state-owned. 
 
5.3 Competing Risks 
So far, we have assumed that the mechanism driving job exit is the same across 
all destination states. However, it is quite plausible that the independent variables 
influence exit into different destination states differently. For instance, highly 
skilled persons are not as likely to become unemployed as low-skilled workers, 
but due to their better chances on the external labour market, they can be 
expected to move more frequently from one job to another. With a competing 
risks model, we are able to separate the two effects. Using the definitions given 
in section 2, we distinguish between three destination states: moving to another 
employer, unemployment, and non-employment. We display only results for the 
first two destination states. They are contained in the fourth and fifth column of 
each table. The specification is comparable with the specification of the second 
column but the coefficients cannot be compared directly because in a competing 
risks model hazard ratios may not be interpreted qualitatively. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
In table 7, we provide likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis of a single exit 
state versus the competing risks model. In all population groups, the single exit 
state model is clearly rejected in favour of the multiple-state model. 
                                              
14  Quantile regressions could give more detailed information about the relation of firm-size and job 
duration and should be part of further research. 
15  According to the structure of our data all firms should be established before 1996. Nevertheless some 
firms reported 1996 or later as “year of setting up” which can be due to changes in the ownership. 
 28
The impact of age differs a lot between the destination states as well as 
between employee groups. Whereas there are no significant effects for West 
Germans if they move to unemployment, the hazard ratios decline with age-
intervals for East German women and increase for East German men. The 
hypothesis “the older the employees the lower the job exit hazard” holds only for 
all employee groups in the case of job-to-job transitions. By contrast, the risk of 
becoming unemployed is by and large independent of age. Our findings are 
similar to those obtained by Wolff (2004). These results are an indicator that both 
theories job-shopping as well as loss of human capital during unemployment 
periods cannot be rejected. 
 The influence on tenure of the labour market state before the job was 
taken on depends strongly on the destination state. Obviously there is a strong 
relation between the original and the destination state but again one should take 
the endogeneity problem into account. Employees who came from 
unemployment have a high probability to return to unemployment after relatively 
short time. Wolff (2004) yields the same results but Bender et al. (2000) cannot 
find a significant impact of previous unemployment. The impact of employment 
history on job-to-job transitions is less clear. Whereas employees with recall 
have significantly lower hazard rates, coming from another employer leads to 
significantly higher hazard rates for West German women and significantly lower 
hazard rates for East German women. The coefficients for men are insignificant. 
Conditioning on other covariates such as age and qualifications, there appears to 
be no distinct group of job shoppers who frequently move from one employer to 
another. This is in contrast to Bender et al. (2000) who find higher hazard rates 
for men who move from job-to-job. 
  Better education and better job position reduce the risk of unemployment 
but do not retard job-to-job changes. In particular, employees with university 
degree generally have the lowest exit rates into unemployment. A striking 
difference is that in East Germany, more educated workers move more frequently 
from one job to another, while this is not true for West German workers.  
Referring to unskilled blue-collar workers, skilled blue- and white-collar workers 
have longer job durations if they move into unemployment afterwards. The 
selection of low-skilled individuals in partial labour markets with low job 
stability is the reason for this result. The lagged unemployment rate increases the 
probability of exit into unemployment in the West but not in the East, while it 
makes job-to-job changes less likely among East German women.  
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 Among the firm-level independent variables, the impact of firm-size is 
again found to be less ambiguous in West Germany. Here, being employed in a 
large firm clearly protects against unemployment. By contrast, there is little 
evidence that firm size has an impact on job-to-job changes. The works council 
effect has the same magnitude for both destination states. Hence, there is support 
both for the “voice” function of works councils preventing exits of dissatisfied 
workers from their employers as well as for the effect of works councils on 
employment protection. For West German men, both firm-sponsored training and 
the use of ICT decrease the job change probability. These effects are less clear 
for other population groups.  
 
  
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we use a new linked employer-employee dataset to analyse the 
individual and firm-specific determinants of job durations in Germany. Due to 
the flow sampling scheme and the relative small time dimension of the data, we 
restrict the analysis to job durations of six years maximum. Significant 
differences between men and women and East and West Germany show that it is 
important to perform separate analyses. As opposed to other studies, we find 
median durations to be longer for women than for men, which may be due to the 
exclusion of young workers below the age of 25 as well as to our treatment of 
parental leave. It may also be due to other definitions such as recalls and 
unemployment, the effects of which are still unexplored given that the data have 
become available only recently. Due to a high rate of participants in job creation 
programmes in East Germany and possibly also due to unsubsidised temporary 
work, many employment contracts end precisely after one year.  
 A special focus of the paper is on the question whether there is 
heterogeneity in tenure between or across firms. Isolating within-firm dispersion 
in tenure durations from between-firm heterogeneity, we find that dispersion 
within firms is only moderately lower than dispersion over the whole sample: the 
interquantile range is reduced by only about 20 per cent by eliminating the 
between-firm dimension. This is consistent with the view that long and short 
employment spells coexist at the firm level. The reasons for this coexistence, 
however, need to be explored in further research. In particular, is there an 
endogenous segmentation of workers with similar characteristics, or do different 
job durations at the firm level arise due to different worker characteristics? 
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 The coefficients estimated for individual characteristics point to the 
presence of partial labour markets. Low-skilled employees in low job positions 
have significantly shorter job durations. In addition, effects of employment 
history call attention to the fact that these groups could be affected by persistence 
of unemployment or non-employment. Although job shopping seems to be 
popular across younger workers, there is no strong evidence that high qualified 
employees are more mobile than others. A competing risks framework shows 
that mobility to another job and exit to unemployment follow strikingly different 
processes. 
 Among firm characteristics, institutional variables such as the firm’s legal 
structure, the presence of a works council and, to a lesser degree, the adherence 
to collective agreements, matter for job durations. Works councils retard job exit 
both into unemployment and into another job, which gives support both to the 
“voice” function of worker participation as well as to its effect on employment 
protection. Contrary to the descriptive evidence but in accordance with other 
studies, firm size is of secondary importance.  
 Further research should relax some of the assumptions that were made in 
estimation. Most importantly, one should relax the assumption of independence 
between individual and firm-level heterogeneity. In accordance with Abowd and 
Kramarz (1999), person-level fixed effects could be included if estimation was 
restricted to individuals having more than one spell in the dataset. However, 
estimating job exits on the movers only comes at the cost of having a selected 
sample. Moreover, no inference can be made as to the distribution of exit 
probabilities within firms. 
 A second issue is that covariates may affect exit probabilities differently at 
different durations. In this way, one could isolate the factors that lead to firm-
level segmentation. For instance, do firms with a works council have more 
dispersion than firms without a works council, because insiders use shop-level 
participation to increase their own job stability at the expense of newly hired 
insiders? This issue seems highly relevant in view of the evidence for substantial 
within-firm heterogeneity in job durations found in this study. 
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Table 1: Shares of destination and previous employment states (in per cent) 
 Men Women 
 West East West East 
Destination state 
Unemployment 10.63 31.82 12.16 35.94 
Non-employment 5.45 3.99 6.23 2.62 
New employer 15.73 12.17 13.04 6.84 
Censored 68.19 52.01 68.57 54.60 
 
Previous employment state 
Unemployment 21.56 49.03 20.73 49.53 
Non-employment  6.13 4.12 6.17 2.38 
Recall 18.62 12.00 26.45 22.48 
Job-to-job transition 45.14 28.53 34.99 20.42 
No observation 8.56 6.31 11.66 5.19 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated interquantile ranges (in days) 
Men West  East 
 α = 50 α = 40 α = 30  α = 50 α = 40 α = 30 
Total sample (rα, 90) 406 281 170  306 224 150 
Average over 
establishments ( ,90αr ) 
315 
(903) 
218 
(1105) 
172 
(1311) 
 248 
(880) 
212 
(1007) 
147 
(1156) 
Per cent reduction -0.22 -0.22 +0.01  -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 
        
Women West  East 
 α = 50 α = 40 α = 30  α = 50 α = 40 α = 30 
Total sample 434 305 207  273 273 214 
Average over 
establishments 
377 
(743) 
257 
(937) 
178 
(1129) 
 193 
(747) 
196 
(864) 
171 
(1018) 
Per cent reduction -0.13 -0.16 -0.14  -0.29 -0.28 -0.20 
Note: Number of sectors and establishments included in the estimation are given in parentheses. 
The total number of establishments is 1777 for West German men, 1554 for East German men, 
1714 for West German women and 1536 for East German women.  
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Table 3: Results from Cox estimation, West Germany, male workers 
 only X’s X’s & Z’s Stratified Unemployed Job-to-job 
Age in years (reference group: 25-29) 
0.859 0.856 0.838 0.896 0.884 30-34 
(-3.58) (-3.48) (-4.64) (-1.44) (-2.00) 
0.792 0.806 0.828 0.956 0.773 35-39 
(-5.20) (-4.61) (-4.71) (-0.57) (-4.06) 
0.780 0.776 0.754 1.080 0.676 40-44 
(-4.92) (-4.94) (-6.25) (0.87) (-5.45) 
0.604 0.611 0.627 0.916 0.465 45-52 
(-9.73) (-8.85) (-9.95) (-1.05) (-9.89) 
Education (reference group: no professional training) 
0.905 0.922 0.863 1.016 0.878 Vocational 
training (-2.25) (-1.77) (-3.74) (0.23) (-1.88) 
0.878 0.960 0.934 0.852 0.885 Voc. training & 
A-level (-1.62) (-0.46) (-0.96) (-0.91) (-1.14) 
0.678 0.752 0.800 0.671 0.876 University 
(-6.06) (-4.07) (-3.69) (-3.14) (-1.36) 
Job position (reference group: unskilled blue-collar) 
0.937 0.848 0.739 0.725 1.042 Skilled blue-
collar (-1.51) (-3.62) (-6.68) (-4.47) (0.58) 
0.658 0.700 0.743 0.542 0.990 White-collar 
(-7.38) (-5.77) (-4.81) (-5.47) (-0.11) 
0.767 0.706 0.789 0.449 1.228 Master 
craftsman (-2.27) (-2.96) (-1.79) (-3.61) (1.17) 
1.129 1.195 1.104 1.040 1.158 Part-time worker 
(1.51) (2.04) (1.32) (0.29) (1.10) 
Occupation (reference group: service workers) 
0.890 1.056 1.058 1.185 1.042 Production 
workers (-2.95) (1.03) (1.02) (2.12) (0.54) 
0.858 0.961 0.958 1.290 0.813 Technicians 
(-2.76) (-0.64) (-0.74) (2.01) (-2.75) 
0.587 0.553 2.096 0.419 0.371 Others 
(-1.20) (-1.04) (4.32) (-1.64) (-1.79) 
Nationality (reference group: German) 
0.907 0.907 0.846 0.548 1.110 EU citizen 
(-0.88) (-0.84) (-1.54) (-2.87) (0.70) 
1.305 1.265 1.072 1.429 0.998 No EU citizen 
(5.02) (4.52) (1.44) (4.28) (-0.03) 
Previous employment state (reference group: no observation) 
1.341 1.326 1.155 3.478 0.923 Unemployment 
(4.86) (4.28) (2.63) (10.15) (-0.85) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
1.419 1.400 1.234 1.261 1.368 Non-
employment (4.85) (4.36) (3.06) (1.32) (2.80) 
0.517 0.597 0.595 0.803 0.466 Recall 
(-7.68) (-6.12) (-7.30) (-1.45) (-6.38) 
0.769 0.855 0.861 1.157 1.059 Job-to-job 
change (-4.46) (-2.51) (-2.85) (1.16) (0.65) 
Calendar time (reference group: 2001) 
1.099 1.021 1.042 0.985 0.771 1996 
(1.51) (0.33) (0.55) (-0.16) (-2.59)
1.197 1.086 1.203 1.029 0.785 1997 
(3.24) (1.43) (2.02) (0.30) (-2.91) 
1.131 1.019 1.137 0.820 0.930 1998 
(2.27) (0.33) (1.10) (-2.08) (-0.96) 
1.161 1.072 1.208 0.896 1.061 1999 
(3.03) (1.40) (2.06) (-1.31) (0.90) 
1.341 1.276 1.256 0.934 1.375 2000 
(6.22) (5.14) (3.41) (-0.77) (5.53) 
Local labour market 
1.002 1.020 0.994 1.069 0.988 Unemployment 
rate (0.27) (2.36) (-0.16) (4.66) (-0.99) 
Investments in (reference group: no investment) 
 0.870 0.847 0.912 0.815 ICT 
 (-3.90) (-3.78) (-1.53) (-4.09) 
 0.916 0.937 0.968 0.835 Further training 
 (-2.11) (-0.93) (-0.50) (-3.02) 
Collective agreements (reference group: no collective agreement) 
 0.928 1.114 0.881 0.993 Sector-wide  
 (-1.63) (1.42) (-1.72) (-0.10) 
 1.007 1.286 1.109 0.873 Firm-level 
 (0.10) (2.30) (0.99) (-1.49) 
 0.931 0.893 0.940 0.954 Wages > tariff 
 (-2.05) (-2.02) (-1.05) (-0.96) 
 0.788 0.812 0.802 Works council 
 (-6.72)  (-3.53) (-4.47) 
Legal form (reference group: individual firm) 
 0.943 0.861 1.057 Partnership 
 (-0.77)  (-1.19) (0.47) 
 1.089 1.041 1.193 Private limited 
company  (1.37)  (0.42) (1.75) 
 1.078 0.956 1.148 Public limited 
company  (1.04)  (-0.39) (1.26) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 0.673 0.623 0.768 Public 
Corporation   (-3.81)  (-2.77) (-1.95) 
 0.708 0.753 0.811 Other (e.g. 
association)  (-3.49)  (-1.95) (-1.40) 
Firm size (reference group: 100-199 employees) 
 1.180 1.706 0.894 ≤ 4 
 (1.16)  (2.66) (-0.45) 
 1.123 1.449 0.945 5-19 
 (2.07)  (4.28) (-0.70) 
 1.076 1.190 1.050 20-49 
 (1.75)  (2.66) (0.82) 
 1.208 1.222 1.197 50-99 
 (5.35)  (3.38) (3.73) 
 0.984 0.962 1.024 200-299 
 (-0.52)  (-0.76) (0.52) 
 1.018 0.983 1.004 300-499 
 (0.58)  (-0.34) (0.09) 
 1.052 1.053 1.085 500-999 
 (1.62)  (1.00) (1.87) 
 0.885 0.804 0.859 ≥ 1000 
 (-3.17)  (-3.38) (-2.91) 
Year of setting up (reference group: 1981-1990) 
≤ 1980   0.934 1.091 0.817 
   (-1.28)  (1.01) (-2.79) 
1991-1995   0.922 0.966 0.890 
   (-1.33)  (-0.34) (-1.42) 
≥ 1996   1.020  0.909 1.052 
   (0.21) (-0.64) (0.40) 
Wald Chi² 1,282.47 3,487.60 705.16 3,777.32 1,720.82 
Log likelihood -1,112,796.6 -1,107,531.2 -472,819.21 -431,834.14 -496,835.69 
# Subjects ? 200,279 ? 
# Obs. ? 529,293 ? 
# Failures 63,701 21,282 31,496 
Note: Results are shown in hazard ratios; t-values are in parentheses below. Additional 
covariates are countries and sectors. 
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Table 4: Results from Cox estimation, East Germany, male workers 
 only X’s X’s & Z’s Stratified Unemployed Job-to-job 
Age in years (reference group: 25-29) 
0.943 0.957 0.908 1.100 0.808 30-34 
(-1.13) (-0.81) (-2.11) (1.27) (-2.61) 
0.974 1.008 0.897 1.187 0.810 35-39 
(-0.52) (0.15) (-2.20) (2.27) (-2.40) 
0.934 0.976 0.904 1.187 0.758 40-44 
(-1.38) (-0.47) (-2.17) (2.49) (-2.95) 
0.923 0.972 0.886 1.325 0.532 45-52 
(-1.75) (-0.58) (-2.67) (4.23) (-7.34) 
Education (reference group: no professional training) 
0.893 0.895 0.821 0.869 1.129 Vocational 
training (-2.30) (-2.27) (-5.07) (-2.53) (1.07) 
1.078 1.091 0.965 0.902 1.645 Voc. training & 
A-level (0.63) (0.72) (-0.37) (-0.78) (2.31) 
0.858 0.875 0.898 0.676 1.410 University 
(-2.11) (-1.71) (-1.55) (-3.65) (2.33) 
Job position (reference group: unskilled blue-collar) 
0.744 0.789 0.788 0.762 0.909 Skilled blue-
collar (-8.42) (-6.06) (-5.28) (-5.65) (-1.41) 
0.483 0.525 0.658 0.433 0.706 White-collar 
(-13.22) (-10.76) (-6.63) (-9.95) (-3.24) 
0.466 0.512 0.569 0.443 0.821 Master 
craftsman (-6.19) (-5.15) (-5.24) (-5.71) (-0.91) 
1.068 1.066 1.075 1.040 0.848 Part-time worker 
(2.10) (1.69) (1.56) (0.94) (-1.67) 
Occupation (reference group: service workers) 
1.169 1.136 1.057 1.177 0.960 Production 
workers (3.69) (2.59) (1.37) (2.68) (-0.47) 
1.010 0.943 0.966 1.020 0.867 Technicians 
(0.14) (-0.85) (-0.58) (0.21) (-1.41) 
1.561 1.453 1.294 1.701 0.803 Others 
(6.21) (5.39) (4.07) (6.89) (-1.18) 
Nationality (reference group: German) 
1.751 1.841 1.299 0.889 2.848 EU citizen 
(1.93) (2.08) (0.88) (-0.23) (2.48) 
1.290 1.336 1.026 0.933 1.549 No EU citizen 
(2.95) (3.18) (0.23) (-0.46) (2.27) 
Previous employment state (reference group: no observation) 
1.807 1.587 1.520 3.103 0.933 Unemployment 
(7.56) (5.64) (5.39) (10.58) (-0.46) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
1.409 1.417 1.444 1.135 1.450 Non-
employment (3.38) (3.33) (3.74) (0.78) (2.18) 
0.508 0.569 0.734 0.715 0.531 Recall 
(-6.95) (-5.69) (-3.41) (-2.40) (-3.61) 
0.794 0.874 1.077 1.205 0.899 Job-to-job 
change (-2.92) (-1.66) (0.96) (1.65) (-0.76) 
Calendar time (reference group: 2001) 
0.924 0.986 1.112 0.994 0.866 1996 
(-1.29) (-0.23) (1.53) (-0.08) (-1.24)
1.109 1.124 1.046 1.062 1.079 1997 
(2.20) (2.44) (0.94) (1.02) (0.86) 
0.781 0.860 0.938 0.876 0.708 1998 
(-4.68) (-2.85) (-1.15) (-2.01) (-3.62) 
0.989 1.042 1.092 1.073 0.896 1999 
(-0.22) (0.82) (1.64) (1.16) (-1.20) 
1.123 1.140 1.115 1.103 1.112 2000 
(2.21) (2.53) (2.44) (1.50) (1.15) 
Local labour market 
0.977 0.980 1.014 0.983 0.980 Unemployment 
rate (-2.89) (-2.56) (0.83) (-1.68) (-1.30) 
Investments in (reference group: no investment) 
 0.910 0.871 0.941 0.857 ICT 
 (-2.91) (-3.63) (-1.53) (-2.64) 
 0.905 1.136 0.852 0.979 Further training 
 (-2.54) (2.45) (-3.42) (-0.27) 
Collective agreements (reference group: no collective agreement) 
 0.922 0.948 0.958 0.873 Sector-wide  
 (-2.41) (-1.05) (-1.02) (-2.17) 
 1.042 0.939 1.091 0.920 Firm-wide 
 (1.08) (-1.25) (1.97) (-1.02) 
 0.904 0.818 0.898 0.910 Wages > tariff 
 (-2.33) (-3.08) (-1.82) (-1.30) 
 0.746 0.770 0.665 Works council 
 (-9.92)  (-7.51) (-7.65) 
Legal form (reference group: individual firm) 
 1.024 0.982 1.135 Partnership 
 (0.23)  (-0.13) (0.79) 
 1.084 1.087 1.115 Private limited 
company  (1.41)  (1.14) (0.97) 
 0.863 1.014 0.713 Public limited 
company  (-1.16)  (0.10) (-1.73) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 0.776 0.919 0.644 Public 
Corporation   (-3.26)  (-0.92) (-2.66) 
 0.995 1.085 0.884 Other (e.g. 
association)  (-0.07)  (0.98) (-0.80) 
Firm size (reference group: 100-199 employees) 
 0.883 0.892 0.867 ≤ 4 
 (-0.74)  (-0.63) (-0.49) 
 1.189 1.121 1.397 5-19 
 (3.44)  (1.74) (4.20) 
 0.857 0.799 1.041 20-49 
 (-3.84)  (-4.47) (0.53) 
 1.076 1.046 1.178 50-99 
 (2.35)  (1.23) (2.58) 
 1.125 1.054 1.256 200-299 
 (4.40)  (1.68) (3.91) 
 1.185 1.138 1.088 300-499 
 (5.58)  (3.80) (1.13) 
 1.120 1.021 1.328 500-999 
 (3.80)  (0.61) (4.49) 
 1.050 0.971 1.398 ≥ 1000 
 (1.30)  (-0.63) (4.47) 
Year of setting up (reference group: 1981-1990) 
≤ 1980   0.766 0.603 1.328 
   (-2.00)  (-2.91) (1.25) 
1991-1995   0.924 0.934 0.927 
   (-2.37)  (-1.68) (-1.14) 
≥ 1996   0.723  0.611 1.024 
   (-6.27) (-6.96) (0.28) 
Wald Chi² 3,195.51 6,035.77 543.28 6,411.72 1,513.56 
Log likelihood -521,762.12 -517,939.65 -215,219.8 -316,345.64 -157,189.32 
# Subjects ? 104,455 ? 
# Obs. ? 238,050 ? 
# Failures 50,123 33,240 12,716 
Note: Results are shown in hazard ratios; t-values are in parentheses below. Additional 
covariates are countries and sectors. 
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Table 5: Results from Cox estimation, West Germany, female workers 
 only X’s X’s & Z’s Stratified Unemployed Job-to-job 
Age in years (reference group: 25-29) 
0.807 0.822 0.799 1.006 0.792 30-34 
(-3.69) (-3.31) (-4.52) (0.06) (-2.69) 
0.736 0.745 0.763 0.794 0.853 35-39 
(-4.66) (-4.45) (-5.33) (-2.03) (-1.53) 
0.738 0.751 0.743 0.894 0.692 40-44 
(-4.24) (-3.93) (-5.26) (-0.99) (-3.20) 
0.697 0.708 0.733 0.955 0.532 45-52 
(-5.28) (-5.05) (-5.60) (-0.43) (-6.19) 
Education (reference group: no professional training) 
0.649 0.656 0.768 0.680 0.692 Vocational 
training (-8.13) (-8.03) (-5.53) (-4.66) (-4.29) 
0.604 0.648 0.735 0.466 0.748 Voc. training & 
A-level (-5.70) (-4.73) (-4.07) (-4.66) (-2.27) 
0.599 0.660 0.824 0.574 0.860 University 
(-4.76) (-3.70) (-2.48) (-3.59) (-0.88) 
Job position (reference group: unskilled blue-collar) 
1.252 1.046 1.089 0.964 0.971 Skilled blue-
collar (2.35) (0.44) (0.80) (-0.24) (-0.15) 
0.768 0.770 0.833 0.694 0.849 White-collar 
(-3.71) (-3.46) (-2.44) (-2.95) (-1.34) 
0.711 0.723 0.820 0.630 0.712 Part-time worker 
(-5.06) (-4.39) (-2.54) (-4.01) (-2.95) 
Occupation (reference group: service workers) 
0.824 1.006 0.960 1.247 0.732 Production 
workers (-3.46) (0.09) (-0.58) (2.06) (-2.56) 
0.867 1.001 0.886 1.098 0.856 Technicians 
(-1.27) (0.01) (-1.19) (0.49) (-0.86) 
0.785 0.758 1.837 0.552 0.751 Others 
(-0.60) (-0.56) (2.27) (-0.76) (-0.55) 
Nationality (reference group: German) 
0.710 0.741 0.809 0.606 0.747 EU citizen 
(-3.43) (-3.00) (-2.71) (-2.36) (-1.85) 
1.223 1.164 0.918 1.193 0.635 No EU citizen 
(2.38) (1.86) (-1.40) (1.71) (-3.92) 
Previous employment state (reference group: no observation) 
1.803 1.772 1.567 3.991 1.188 Unemployment 
(9.37) (8.58) (8.39) (14.38) (1.52) 
1.543 1.501 1.518 1.458 1.399 Non-
employment (5.00) (4.39) (5.75) (2.14) (2.23) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
0.639 0.678 0.699 0.772 0.550 Recall 
(-4.58) (-4.02) (-5.67) (-1.90) (-4.52) 
1.094 1.134 1.168 1.254 1.588 Job-to-job 
change (1.41) (1.88) (2.83) (2.07) (4.20) 
Calendar time (reference group: 2001) 
1.262 1.258 1.501 1.460 0.662 1996 
(2.77) (2.68) (4.99) (2.72) (-3.09)
1.364 1.336 1.648 1.386 0.767 1997 
(4.18) (3.84) (5.27) (2.60) (-2.47) 
1.232 1.194 1.778 1.052 0.871 1998 
(2.74) (2.29) (4.62) (0.41) (-1.10) 
1.366 1.333 1.766 1.180 1.106 1999 
(4.70) (4.30) (5.64) (1.48) (1.11) 
1.349 1.337 1.504 1.118 1.281 2000 
(4.70) (4.55) (5.32) (0.98) (2.94) 
Local labour market 
1.014 1.019 0.906 1.041 1.018 Unemployment 
rate (1.15) (1.49) (-2.37) (2.26) (0.92) 
Investments in (reference group: no investment) 
 0.955 0.794 1.004 0.955 ICT 
 (-0.98) (-4.20) (0.06) (-0.60) 
 0.970 0.940 0.898 1.062 Further training 
 (-0.46) (-0.59) (-1.05) (0.57) 
Collective agreements (reference group: no collective agreement) 
 0.938 1.236 0.972 0.866 Sector-wide  
 (-1.04) (2.41) (-0.31) (-1.47) 
 0.964 1.145 0.942 0.834 Firm-wide 
 (-0.41) (1.19) (-0.51) (-1.38) 
 1.091 1.014 0.899 1.252 Wages > tariff 
 (1.74) (0.19) (-1.31) (2.96) 
 0.852 0.857 0.823 Works council 
 (-2.96)  (-1.92) (-2.11) 
Legal form (reference group: individual firm) 
 0.976 0.853 0.966 Partnership 
 (-0.23)  (-0.92) (-0.19) 
 1.034 0.965 1.151 Private limited 
company  (0.32)  (-0.24) (0.84) 
 1.249 1.000 1.301 Public limited 
company  (1.82)  (0.00) (1.31) 
 0.730 0.768 0.743 Public 
Corporation   (-2.68)  (-1.42) (-1.63) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 0.843 1.078 0.778 Other (e.g. 
association)  (-1.56)  (0.45) (-1.36) 
Firm size (reference group: 100-199 employees) 
 1.204 1.130 1.271 ≤ 4 
 (1.01)  (0.48) (0.82) 
 1.111 1.234 0.997 5-19 
 (1.44)  (1.84) (-0.02) 
 1.102 1.088 1.284 20-49 
 (1.77)  (0.95) (3.14) 
 1.261 1.147 1.500 50-99 
 (4.96)  (1.82) (5.79) 
 1.185 1.245 1.120 200-299 
 (3.85)  (3.27) (1.53) 
 1.028 1.044 1.067 300-499 
 (0.65)  (0.62) (0.96) 
 0.978 0.943 1.067 500-999 
 (-0.54)  (-0.85) (1.04) 
 1.027 0.941 1.093 ≥ 1000 
 (0.55)  (-0.78) (1.22) 
Year of setting up (reference group: 1981-1990) 
≤ 1980   0.867 0.908 0.849 
   (-1.90)  (-0.77) (-1.49) 
1991-1995   0.860 0.851 0.895 
   (-1.74)  (-1.17) (-0.92) 
≥ 1996   0.676  1.038 0.442 
   (-3.29) (0.22) (-3.94) 
Wald Chi² 891.32 1,682.39 511.66 2,401.25 851.84 
Log likelihood -563,041.41 -561,166.43 -225,136.11 -224,902.3 -222,701.15 
# Subjects ? 129,198 ? 
# Obs. ? 326,352 ? 
# Failures 40,612 15,705 16,853 
Note: Results are shown in hazard ratios; t-values are in parentheses below. Additional 
covariates are countries and sectors. 
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Table 6: Results from Cox estimation, East Germany, female workers 
 only X’s X’s & Z’s Stratified Unemployed Job-to-job 
Age in years (reference group: 25-29) 
0.857 0.861 0.877 1.013 0.681 30-34 
(-2.94) (-2.84) (-3.20) (0.21) (-3.49) 
0.848 0.857 0.830 1.056 0.561 35-39 
(-2.89) (-2.67) (-4.58) (0.79) (-5.13) 
0.808 0.811 0.784 1.023 0.532 40-44 
(-3.88) (-3.74) (-5.76) (0.37) (-5.06) 
0.780 0.779 0.763 0.999 0.396 45-52 
(-4.96) (-5.02) (-6.98) (-0.01) (-7.70) 
Education (reference group: no professional training) 
0.889 0.891 0.744 0.901 0.887 Vocational 
training (-1.96) (-2.19) (-7.43) (-1.96) (-0.80) 
0.966 1.029 1.016 0.856 1.800 Voc. training & 
A-level (-0.32) (0.26) (0.16) (-1.21) (2.80) 
0.954 1.037 0.911 0.792 1.688 University 
(-0.59) (0.50) (-1.36) (-2.59) (3.04) 
Job position (reference group: unskilled blue-collar) 
0.859 0.845 0.873 0.797 1.022 Skilled blue-
collar (-2.79) (-2.96) (-2.48) (-3.84) (0.18) 
0.625 0.571 0.616 0.606 0.559 White-collar 
(-6.97) (-8.50) (-10.49) (-7.76) (-4.95) 
0.965 0.848 0.923 0.884 0.777 Part-time worker 
(-0.68) (-3.20) (-2.13) (-2.51) (-2.29) 
Occupation (reference group: service workers) 
1.609 1.589 1.331 1.853 0.849 Production 
workers (10.08) (10.72) (9.40) (13.76) (-1.51) 
1.302 1.063 1.010 1.262 0.680 Technicians 
(4.00) (0.87) (0.14) (3.37) (-2.31) 
1.963 1.730 1.500 2.244 0.627 Others 
(9.87) (6.55) (6.14) (9.56) (-1.66) 
Nationality (reference group: German) 
1.822 1.867 0.550 0.505 2.899 EU citizen 
(1.98) (2.89) (-1.37) (-1.49) (1.60) 
1.326 1.220 1.285 1.246 1.018 No EU citizen 
(2.59) (1.72) (2.23) (1.49) (0.08) 
Previous employment state (reference group: no observation) 
1.846 1.693 1.499 3.178 0.803 Unemployment 
(7.45) (6.37) (6.28) (13.36) (-1.44) 
0.831 0.976 1.149 0.788 1.019 Non-
employment (-1.38) (-0.19) (1.40) (-1.73) (0.09) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
0.383 0.400 0.425 0.545 0.353 Recall 
(-8.31) (-8.18) (-11.03) (-3.94) (-5.94) 
0.445 0.573 0.824 0.578 0.945 Job-to-job 
change (-8.92) (-6.24) (-2.70) (-5.13) (-0.38) 
Calendar time (reference group: 2001) 
0.870 0.951 0.979 1.078 0.507 1996 
(-2.10) (-0.72) (-0.36) (1.04) (-3.76)
1.035 1.077 1.040 1.099 0.629 1997 
(0.67) (1.37) (0.98) (1.70) (-3.08) 
0.737 0.833 0.910 0.832 0.704 1998 
(-5.28) (-3.13) (-1.97) (-2.75) (-2.73) 
1.079 1.116 1.156 1.143 0.854 1999 
(1.28) (1.84) (3.68) (1.96) (-1.30) 
1.111 1.144 1.047 1.075 1.074 2000 
(1.91) (2.42) (1.21) (1.16) (0.60) 
Local labour market 
0.953 0.980 0.991 0.992 0.911 Unemployment 
rate (-6.21) (-2.54) (-0.64) (-0.81) (-4.95) 
Investments in (reference group: no investment) 
 0.967 0.943 0.955 1.056 ICT 
 (-1.09) (-1.94) (-1.35) (0.66) 
 0.887 1.134 0.864 1.018 Further training 
 (-2.92) (3.02) (-3.44) (0.14) 
Collective agreements (reference group: no collective agreement) 
 0.876 0.872 0.917 0.727 Sector-wide  
 (-3.28) (-2.80) (-1.88) (-3.52) 
 1.067 0.850 1.163 0.789 Firm-wide 
 (1.56) (-3.89) (3.32) (-2.35) 
 1.010 0.923 0.903 1.178 Wages > tariff 
 (0.16) (-1.14) (-1.39) (1.22) 
 0.783 0.791 0.775 Works council 
 (-7.38)  (-6.12) (-3.59) 
Legal form (reference group: individual firm) 
 1.376 1.408 1.251 Partnership 
 (2.03)  (1.86) (0.82) 
 1.120 1.144 1.135 Private limited 
company  (1.08)  (1.05) (0.62) 
 1.318 1.359 0.911 Public limited 
company  (1.75)  (1.54) (-0.30) 
 0.932 1.066 0.790 Public 
Corporation   (-0.59)  (0.42) (-1.06) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 1.050 1.226 0.832 Other (e.g. 
association)  (0.43)  (1.47) (-0.83) 
Firm size (reference group: 100-199 employees) 
 0.907 0.853 0.829 ≤ 4 
 (-0.61)  (-0.83) (-0.57) 
 0.779 0.771 0.897 5-19 
 (-3.22)  (-2.72) (-0.77) 
 0.660 0.654 0.860 20-49 
 (-8.38)  (-6.92) (-1.51) 
 0.876 0.877 1.008 50-99 
 (-3.86)  (-3.56) (0.10) 
 0.961 0.978 0.933 200-299 
 (-1.70)  (-0.86) (-1.10) 
 0.943 0.906 1.120 300-499 
 (-2.33)  (-3.72) (1.56) 
 0.963 0.968 1.083 500-999 
 (-1.59)  (-1.21) (1.28) 
 0.719 0.716 0.692 ≥ 1000 
 (-8.00)  (-7.73) (-3.24) 
Year of setting up (reference group: 1981-1990) 
≤ 1980   0.688 0.681 0.858 
   (-2.63)  (-2.16) (-0.95) 
1991-1995   0.985 0.982 1.062 
   (-0.38)  (-0.39) (0.72) 
≥ 1996   0.602  0.548 1.065 
   (-7.20) (-5.91) (0.48) 
Wald Chi² 5,118.27 7,163.75 1,184.29 7,986.27 1,170.73 
Log likelihood -412,241.87 -409,707.26 -170,924.57 -293,829.1 -81,508.027 
# Subjects ?  130,002  ? 
# Obs. ?  290,370  ? 
# Failures 59,019 46,723 8,896 
Note: Results are shown in hazard ratios; t-values are in parentheses below. Additional 
covariates are countries and sectors. 
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Table 7: LR Tests of competing risks versus single exit state 
 Men Women 
 West East West East 
∑ log likelihood of 
unrestricted model -1,092,909 -512,068 -552,322 -404,280
Log likelihood of 
restricted model -1,107,531 -517,940 -561,166 -409,707
Likelihood ratio test 
statistic Chi² 
 
29,245 11,742 17,689 
 
 
10,855
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(degrees of freedom) (68) (63) (67) (62)
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 Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier-curves separated for men and women and West 
and East 
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier-curves by educational level separated for West and 
East 
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier-curves by age group separated for West and East 
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier-curves by firm size separated for West and East 
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier-curves by destination state separated for West and 
East 
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Figure 6: An illustration for interquantile differences at the firm level and 
for the whole sample 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Number of observations and failures, means and standard 
deviations of covariates 
Variable Men Women 
 West East West East 
 # spells # spells # spells # spells 
         
Observations 529,293 238,050 326,352 290,370 
    
Destination    
Unemployment 21,282 33,240 15,705 46,723 
Non-employment 10,923 4,167 8,054 3,400 
New employer 31,496 12,716 16,853 8,896 
         
 Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev
         
Come from         
Unemployment 0.194 0.396 0.423 0.494 0.193 0.395 0.437 0.496
Non-employment  0.050 0.218 0.038 0.192 0.053 0.224 0.023 0.150
Recall 0.176 0.381 0.114 0.317 0.237 0.425 0.212 0.409
Job-to-job transition 0.482 0.500 0.346 0.476 0.373 0.484 0.258 0.438
No observation 0.098 0.297 0.079 0.270 0.144 0.351 0.070 0.256
         
Individual-specific          
         
Education         
No training 0.187 0.390 0.056 0.230 0.217 0.412 0.051 0.220
Vocational training 0.554 0.497 0.715 0.451 0.567 0.496 0.782 0.413
Vocational training and 
A-levels 0.049 0.216 0.026 0.160 0.080 0.272 0.033 0.177
Universitv 0.210 0.408 0.202 0.402 0.136 0.342 0.135 0.341
         
Job position         
Blue collar unskilled 0.329 0.470 0.164 0.370 0.181 0.385 0.120 0.324
Blue collar skilled 0.220 0.414 0.378 0.485 0.028 0.164 0.083 0.276
White collar 0.397 0.489 0.321 0.467 0.481 0.500 0.483 0.500
Master craftsman 0.010 0.098 0.015 0.121   
Part-time more than 15 
hours 0.036 0.185 0.121 0.326 0.306 0.461 0.313 0.464
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Table A1 (continued) 
Age         
25-29 0.188 0.391 0.134 0.341 0.184 0.387 0.131 0.338
30-34 0.268 0.443 0.194 0.395 0.274 0.446 0.214 0.410
35-39 0.220 0.414 0.205 0.404 0.220 0.414 0.212 0.408
40-44 0.153 0.360 0.190 0.393 0.155 0.362 0.188 0.391
45-52 0.171 0.376 0.276 0.447 0.167 0.373 0.255 0.436
         
Profession         
3 Production 0.449 0.497 0.508 0.500 0.197 0.398 0.238 0.426
4 Technical 0.136 0.343 0.099 0.298 0.041 0.198 0.043 0.203
5 Services         
6 Others 0.005 0.072 0.012 0.107 0.002 0.048 0.006 0.077
         
Nationality         
German         
EU 0.023 0.151 0.002 0.046 0.024 0.153 0.001 0.029
Non-EU 0.089 0.285 0.021 0.145 0.072 0.258 0.005 0.072
         
Firm-specific         
         
Sector         
Insurance, credit 0.063 0.243 0.010 0.099 0.110 0.313 0.024 0.152
Transport, 
communication 0.068 0.251 0.043 0.204 0.056 0.231 0.012 0.110
Trade, repair 0.044 0.206 0.028 0.166 0.075 0.263 0.031 0.172
Construction 0.023 0.150 0.095 0.293 0.002 0.048 0.007 0.082
Mining, energy, water 0.024 0.154 0.026 0.160 0.010 0.100 0.010 0.101
Finish of raw materials 0.153 0.360 0.087 0.281 0.078 0.268 0.034 0.182
Capital goods 0.406 0.491 0.199 0.399 0.195 0.396 0.060 0.237
Consumer goods 0.043 0.203 0.049 0.216 0.050 0.218 0.050 0.219
Services for firms 0.032 0.177 0.049 0.216 0.033 0.180 0.027 0.161
Other services 0.095 0.294 0.201 0.401 0.276 0.447 0.326 0.469
Non-profit organization 0.012 0.107 0.065 0.246 0.040 0.196 0.111 0.314
Regional authorities, 
social insurances 0.036 0.185 0.148 0.355 0.074 0.262 0.308 0.462
         
Firm-size         
0-4 0.001 0.027 0.002 0.043 0.001 0.031 0.002 0.039
5-19 0.010 0.098 0.024 0.152 0.010 0.098 0.010 0.102
20-49 0.022 0.148 0.052 0.221 0.022 0.148 0.039 0.195
50-99 0.037 0.190 0.097 0.296 0.039 0.195 0.058 0.234
100-199 0.053 0.224 0.157 0.363 0.052 0.222 0.118 0.322
 57
Table A1 (continued) 
200-299 0.059 0.236 0.131 0.337 0.067 0.250 0.135 0.342
300-499 0.088 0.283 0.158 0.365 0.110 0.312 0.170 0.376
500-999 0.149 0.356 0.195 0.396 0.173 0.378 0.232 0.422
≥ 1000 0.581 0.493 0.185 0.388 0.526 0.499 0.235 0.424
         
Bargaining         
Council 0.916 0.277 0.682 0.466 0.912 0.283 0.722 0.448
Sector coll. agreement 0.788 0.409 0.599 0.490 0.765 0.424 0.679 0.467
Firm collective 
agreement 0.127 0.333 0.160 0.367 0.125 0.331 0.140 0.347
Wage > tariff 0.621 0.485 0.132 0.339 0.453 0.498 0.076 0.266
         
Legal form         
Individual firm 0.010 0.100 0.028 0.164 0.007 0.086 0.013 0.111
Partnership 0.064 0.245 0.027 0.161 0.059 0.235 0.014 0.119
Private limited 
partnership 0.438 0.496 0.583 0.493 0.338 0.473 0.388 0.487
Public limited 
partnership 0.359 0.480 0.064 0.245 0.265 0.441 0.026 0.161
Public Corporation 0.099 0.299 0.187 0.390 0.263 0.440 0.395 0.489
Other (e.g. association) 0.030 0.171 0.112 0.315 0.068 0.252 0.163 0.370
         
Year of setting up         
≤ 1980 0.820 0.384 0.027 0.163 0.812 0.391 0.033 0.180
1981-1990 0.057 0.233 0.215 0.411 0.049 0.216 0.240 0.427
1991-1995 0.087 0.281 0.643 0.479 0.116 0.320 0.608 0.488
≥ 1996 0.036 0.185 0.115 0.319 0.024 0.152 0.118 0.323
         
Further training: yes/no 0.958 0.200 0.873 0.333 0.967 0.177 0.887 0.316
Investments in ICT 0.865 0.342 0.732 0.443 0.853 0.354 0.719 0.449
         
Country         
Berlin 0.073 0.260 0.118 0.323 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.025 0.156 0.028 0.166 
Hamburg 0.058 0.233 0.047 0.212 
Lower Saxony 0.091 0.288 0.092 0.288 
Bremen 0.013 0.114 0.014 0.119 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.282 0.450 0.274 0.446 
Hesse 0.095 0.294 0.086 0.280 
Rhineland-
Palatinate/Saarland 0.049 0.215 0.032 0.177 
Baden-Württemberg 0.120 0.325 0.136 0.343 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Bavaria 0.194 0.396 0.173 0.378 
Brandenburg  0.195 0.396  0.186 0.389
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern  0.179 0.384  0.151 0.358
Saxony  0.204 0.403  0.208 0.406
Saxony-Anhalt  0.219 0.414  0.285 0.452
Thuringia  0.203 0.402  0.169 0.375
 
 
